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AbsTrACT
In this paper, we argue that there are important ethical 
questions about healthcare improvement which are 
underexplored. We start by drawing on two existing 
literatures: first, the prevailing, primarily governance- 
oriented, application of ethics to healthcare ’quality 
improvement’ (QI), and second, the application of QI to 
healthcare ethics. We show that these are insufficient 
for ethical analysis of healthcare improvement. In 
pursuit of a broader agenda for an ethics of healthcare 
improvement, we note that QI and ethics can, in some 
respects, be treated as closely related concerns and 
not simply as externally related agendas. To support 
our argument, we explore the gap between ’quality’ 
and ’ethics’ discourses and ask about the possible 
differences between ’good quality healthcare’ and 
’good healthcare’. We suggest that the word ’quality’ 
both adds to and subtracts from the idea of ’good 
healthcare’, and in particular that the technicist inflection 
of quality discourses needs to be set in the context of 
broader conceptualisations of healthcare improvement. 
We introduce the distinction between quality as a 
measurable property and quality as an evaluative 
judgement, suggesting that a core, but neglected, 
question for an ethics of healthcare improvement is 
striking the balance between these two conceptions of 
quality.
Healthcare quality is a major policy and public 
concern and healthcare improvement is a high- 
profile feature of professional practice and debate. 
However, these themes are relatively neglected in 
the healthcare ethics literature. This is surprising 
given the substantive importance of the area in two 
respects. First, is the question of scale—very many 
people are involved in the quality ‘business’ which, 
like public health, impacts on the lives of popu-
lations and communities as well as professional- 
patient dyads. Second, is the question of focus—this 
is an area of health policy and practice that is 
expressly concerned with both making determina-
tions about, and pursuing or underpinning, ‘good’ 
healthcare, something which can hardly be seen as 
marginal to healthcare ethics.
In this paper, we argue that there are important 
ethical questions about healthcare improvement 
which are underexplored. We start by drawing 
on two existing literatures: first, the prevailing, 
primarily governance- oriented, application of 
ethics to healthcare ‘quality improvement’ (QI), and 
second, the application of QI to healthcare ethics. 
We show that these are insufficient for ethical 
analysis of healthcare improvement. In pursuit 
of a broader agenda for an ethics of healthcare 
improvement, we note that QI and ethics can, in 
some respects, be treated as closely related concerns 
and not simply as externally related agendas. To 
support our argument, we explore the gap between 
‘quality’ and ‘ethics’ discourses and ask about the 
possible differences between ‘good quality health-
care’ and ‘good healthcare’. We suggest that the 
word ‘quality’ both adds to and subtracts from the 
idea of ‘good healthcare’, and in particular that the 
technicist inflection of quality discourses needs to 
be set in the context of broader conceptualisations 
of healthcare improvement.
Applying eThiCs TO Qi
Healthcare improvement is a well- established 
domain, although one with fuzzy boundaries. QI, 
in particular, is a professional or quasi- professional 
field: some health services staff have designated QI 
roles, and there are distinct QI projects and prac-
tices with an extensive supporting body of research 
and education. The broader domain of healthcare 
improvement might refer to the work of many 
others, not least the regulatory, guidance, inspec-
tion and educational agencies that contribute to the 
quality of health systems and healthcare practices, 
and sometimes do so explicitly under the descrip-
tion of QI.
The existing ‘QI ethics’ literature mainly revolves 
around the ethical oversight of designated QI proj-
ects.1–3 It has been generated by the perceived need 
to classify QI projects in relation to healthcare 
research projects, given that the latter are subject 
to careful ethical governance and demanding data 
protection legislation. Sometimes the relative 
distinctiveness of QI is emphasised. For example, 
that QI is different to research because it is a routine 
part of healthcare practice, and thus an inherent 
obligation, rather than an optional separate activity 
for both health professionals and patients. Or that 
QI is different to research because it is not centred 
on the production of generalised knowledge but 
rather on immediate local benefit. To make these 
distinctions, Lynn et al4 rely on a definition of 
QI activities as ‘systematic, data- guided activi-
ties designed to bring about immediate improve-
ments in healthcare delivery in particular settings’ 
(p. 667). Other conceptions of QI that argue that 
it can work towards and implement generalisable 
lessons tend not to make sharp distinctions between 
research and QI but treat QI as characteristically 
including both practice and research components.5
This work highlights that, whether or not QI 
should be routinely subject to exactly the same 
ethics governance as research, some kind of 
ethical oversight and accountability is needed for 
QI activity. QI creates the same kinds of ethical 
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challenges as any other kind of healthcare- related activity; for 
example, it can produce harm, waste resources, treat individ-
uals and groups unfairly, fail to respect privacy and so on. Some 
authors and agencies have thus proposed principles and safe-
guards to protect human subjects from QI activity, and propor-
tionate forms of accountability to underpin these.4 As part of a 
set of concerns that include attention to such things as privacy 
and appropriate consent processes, they argue that ‘(t)he gains 
from a QI activity should justify the resources spent and the risks 
imposed on participants’ and ‘(a) QI activity should be designed 
to limit risks while maximising potential benefits and to ensure 
that risks to an individual human participant are balanced by 
expected benefits to the participant and to society’ (p. 668).
Although it involves some simplification, we suggest that QI is 
currently often framed as a set of techniques, or a ‘technology’, 
and the business of ethically appraising QI tends to be treated as 
a form of technology appraisal with utilitarian calculation at its 
backbone. In the above quotations, for example, QI activities are 
presented as being directed towards ‘gains’ or ‘benefits’ which 
have to outweigh the associated ‘resources’ and ‘risks’. This is, of 
course, accompanied by attention to important side- constraints 
such as consent. But in a guide to managing QI ethics,3 the need 
for ethical oversight is itself explained by the fact that QI activ-
ities risk creating physical or psychological harms from which 
people need protection rather than by reference to any ques-
tioning of the values inherent in QI purposes or processes. In 
practice, of course, QI activities can be ethically analysed like any 
other kind of healthcare activity. They rest on assumptions about 
what matters and they deploy specific methods. For example, 
even a ‘routine’ intervention that consists of guidance designed 
to underpin the clinical effectiveness of a treatment raises ethical 
questions about the ways in which effectiveness is defined and 
the broader ethical effects and defensibility of clinical guidance. 
In other words, the literature on QI ethics governance does 
comparatively little to question the broader ethical constitution 
of QI; for example, to acknowledge or unpack the full range 
of goods that are served by, or embodied in, QI activities, or to 
reflect on the ethical status of the practice of QI.
Applying Qi TO eThiCs
There are, of course, many possible conceptions of, and dimen-
sions of, quality.6–9 In healthcare contexts, quality is often equated 
with some relatively focused concerns—most frequently that 
healthcare practices should be effective and safe—but it can be 
extended to include an indeterminate number of other consider-
ations. For example, the highly influential Institute of Medicine 
account of quality includes six dimensions—effectiveness, safety, 
timeliness, efficiency, equity and patient- centredness.8 One small 
part of the vast healthcare quality literature focuses on the idea 
of ‘ethics quality’, that is, on ethics as a dimension of quality.
The idea of ethics quality has been adopted by the US Veterans 
Health Administration (VHA) in order to ensure that ethics—
specifically, attention to the underpinning and enactment of 
appropriate ethical standards—is included in the quality assur-
ance and improvement efforts of their healthcare institutions. 
An important founding text in this field is Susan M Wolf ’s 1994 
paper ‘Quality Assessment of Ethics in Health Care’.10 Wolf 
argues that the rise of bioethics in the USA in the 1970s and 
1980s coincided with the rise of healthcare quality assurance. 
The latter was needed, among other reasons she cites, to protect 
standards and serve public accountability in an era of cost- 
containment. Yet, Wolf is keen to stress, bioethics largely stood 
apart from these other developments and did little to concretely 
specify and assess the ethical standards it was recommending, 
perhaps because bioethicists were generally suspicious of ethics 
enforcement: “Increasingly, we see the quality of other dimen-
sions of care routinely assessed. Ethics is not” (p. 123).
Wolf called for the core logic and methods of quality assur-
ance to be applied to ethics. This entailed (a) specifying good 
quality in ethics, (b) formulating and applying measures of ethics 
quality, (c) using feedback loops to bring about change. The 
VHA’s work on what they label ‘integrated ethics’ (IE) can be 
seen as a full- blown realisation of this call.11 It represents the 
harnessing of QI for ethics:
IE explicitly calls on health care organizations to employ the tools 
of QI to systematically identify recurring ethical concerns, conduct 
root cause analyses, and develop systemic solutions to close “ethics 
quality gaps”. (p. 3)
An ‘ethics quality gap’ is the difference between prevailing 
ethics practices and good ethics practices. It is presented as some-
thing that can be subjected to and identified from measurement. 
For example, a healthcare institution may espouse norms of 
confidentiality or cultural sensitivity with regard to professional 
behaviours, or may see the transparency of its senior manage-
ment board as ethically important. The IE approach involves 
designing measures to capture the level of adherence to such 
standards, and if gaps are identified, implementing interventions 
such as the following: ‘redesigning work processes to better 
support ethical practices; implementing checklists, reminders 
and decision support; developing specific protocols to promote 
ethical practices and redesigning incentive or reward systems to 
motivate practice in accordance with ethics standards’ (p. 5).12
This application of QI to ethics quality reinforces the picture 
of QI as a technology—as about tools and techniques; in so 
doing, it usefully underlines the distance between QI and the 
more open- ended and qualitative ways in which healthcare 
improvement might be discussed and in which ethics is normally 
discussed. It thus also raises some fundamental questions about 
the nature and meaning of quality (which we will turn to in the 
‘Better quality healthcare or better healthcare?’ section).
It seems to us that most bioethicists will have ambivalent feel-
ings about the account of ethics quality summarised here. On the 
one hand, they may readily accept the challenge that bioethics 
often operates too far from the specifics of practice, and there-
fore welcome the ambition of those who are seeking to ‘narrow 
the gap between ethics rhetoric and clinical action’ (p. 128).10 
On the other hand, they are likely to be sceptical about the idea 
of, and measurement of, ethics quality, and about a technological 
approach to ethics more broadly. Such scepticism would arise 
from the insight that there is something inherently contentious 
about what counts as success in ethics and from a closely related 
concern about instrumentalism in ethics, that is, about a model 
that treats ethics ends as something that can be separated out 
from means such as incentives. For example, the VHA identifies 
‘shared decision- making’ (SDM) between clinicians and patients 
as an important professional norm and a dimension of ethics 
quality. But there are deep- seated contests about what counts as 
SDM and about exactly how much of what kinds of SDM are 
ethically desirable in different contexts, for different populations 
and for what reasons.13 14 In addition, the institutional frame-
works that support SDM cannot be separated from these contests. 
SDM practised as a result of a system of extrinsic incentives is, 
prima facie, not the same as SDM practised without such incen-
tives. The same applies to other, including seemingly weaker, 
mechanisms such as protocols, checklists and decision support 
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tools. We might, for instance, want to argue that, or investigate 
whether, protocolised SDM is less authentic and responsive than 
non- protocolised SDM. The chosen mechanisms are constitutive 
of the ends, because judgements of ethics quality are not about 
surface behaviours but about systems of actions and purposes 
that are partly constituted by broader institutional cultures.
In short, treating ethics as a suitable object for QI misappre-
hends the scope of ethics. Ethics—or ethical practice—cannot 
simply be treated as a defined end to aim towards, as the mech-
anisms for achieving ethical ends are also of ethical concern. 
Noticing the shortcomings of applying a means- ends QI model 
to ethics has, of course, implications for the ethics of QI more 
generally (discussed in the ‘Applying ethics to QI’ section). It 
highlights that even if we are inclined to see the centre of gravity 
of QI ethics as about the application of utilitarian thinking to a 
form of healthcare technology, we need to be very mindful of the 
need to balance this emphasis with attention to, and questioning 
of, the ethical constitution and implications of QI purposes and 
processes.
beTTer QuAliTy heAlThCAre Or beTTer heAlThCAre?
Both QI and healthcare ethics are relevant to healthcare improve-
ment, but they construct ‘better healthcare’ in very different 
ways.
When QI is understood as about technical interventions 
designed to bring about measurable improvements in healthcare, 
then ‘quality’ is seen as the product of, and the label for, these 
measurable improvements. This version of things seems to suit 
some facets of healthcare improvement much more than others. 
If we are focusing, for example, on improving the effectiveness 
of a particular kind of treatment then it is plausible to opera-
tionalise some criteria for effectiveness into relevant measures 
and equate an improvement in the measures with an improve-
ment in that dimension of quality. The same could apply in the 
case of safety, operationalised as reforming specific practices to 
take them below a relevantly defined threshold of measurable 
risks and harms. However, this way of looking at things seems 
much less plausible in relation to ethics quality. We can certainly 
construct some measures of adherence to ethics standards but, 
we suggest, it is unlikely that we would ever view these as defin-
itive of ethics quality: rather, at most, they might be useful but 
partial indicators.
In other words, technical operationalisation seems more suited 
to some quality- related concerns than others. But this same point 
could be made by contrasting different ways of understanding 
the nature of ‘quality’. QI largely treats quality as a measurable 
property; by contrast, judgements about ethics are more usually 
seen—in the way qualitative assessments are normally under-
stood—as about the making of non- quantitative and perhaps 
non- quantifiable evaluative judgements.
The ethics quality literature thus represents a useful limiting 
case for QI. The contrasts it highlights apply to other areas of 
healthcare quality and improvement, including several that 
feature prominently in QI literature, such as equity and person- 
centredness. These are arguably among the least operationalisable 
dimensions of healthcare quality, yet within the QI literature—
just as with ethics quality—they are also treated as the names of 
measurable properties.15–17 In other words, the same concerns 
apply to them as to ethics quality. And when we look more 
closely, the more readily operationalisable dimensions of quality, 
such as effectiveness, safety and timeliness, are also contested 
and normative,18 and need to be specified and contextualised 
to make them measurable. This suggests important limits to the 
operationalisation of quality more generally.
For the most part then, reference to healthcare ‘quality’ 
within QI picks out some (combination of) measurements. 
Claims that something will result in ‘better quality healthcare’ 
are situated within technicist discourses—with quality as a 
measurable property that is increased by systematic interven-
tion (understood on a causal model close to that applied in 
biomedical reasoning). Indeed, QI can be seen as parallel to, 
or an extension of, a specific (narrow) conception of biomed-
ical model thinking: as biomedical interventions bring about 
health outcomes, so QI is supposed to bring about more and 
better outcomes.
By contrast, claims that something will result in ‘better 
healthcare’ need not be technicist—they can instead reflect 
an overall evaluative judgement that something is better than 
a comparator. Given this account, we can say that the word 
‘quality’ both adds and subtracts from the idea of ‘better 
healthcare’—it adds a level of specification but at the same 
time disguises the inherent contestability of quality dimen-
sions (including questions about which dimensions matter 
and about how these should be understood). In particular, 
the technicist quality discourse replaces (a) the presumption 
that assessments of ‘better healthcare’ are compatible with, 
and will almost always include, high levels of uncertainty and 
disagreement about healthcare purposes and possibilities, with 
(b) the presumption that it is possible, at least in principle, to 
close down the scope of contestation through more precise 
definitions and measurements.
It is important to stress that there can be broader construc-
tions of healthcare improvement than the technological model 
of QI that we have emphasised. These alternatives encompass 
‘enlightenment’ as well as ‘engineering’ models of change—
for example, recognising the importance of diffuse cultural 
adaptation and of various kinds of learning for healthcare 
actors.19 Nonetheless, these other constructions are usually 
anchored in approaches that operationalise quality because of 
the widespread and understandable commitment to the idea 
that responsible improvement activities must be based around 
carefully specified—and hence measurable—definitions of the 
relevant dimensions of quality whose improvement is being 
sought.
QI ethics has thus to begin with the recognition of the hybrid 
nature of QI. It is a field that is elastic (and wise) enough to 
include relatively open- ended and obviously value- laden ideas 
such as equity and person- centredness within its remit, but 
which is, at the same time, basically committed to seeing quality 
as a measurable property.
TOwArds An eThiCs Of heAlThCAre imprOvemenT
A sufficiently ambitious ethics of healthcare improvement 
must tackle a large range of concerns. Cutting across these 
concerns, we have been suggesting, are critical questions about 
how we think about healthcare improvement including how 
to frame the ethics of improvement. In particular, we need 
to be mindful of the way QI approaches to improvement are 
inflected by the predominance of the ‘measurable property’ 
conception of quality. This makes the ethics of measurement 
and operationalisation central to QI ethics.
This is not an abstract matter. Colleagues working at any 
level of a healthcare system, with an interest in better health-
care, have to decide how to pursue that interest responsibly. 
There are a lot of advantages to operationalising quality. First, 
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there are crucial pragmatic questions: when you are working 
in a context dominated by the biomedical model, especially 
in an era of evidence- based policy, you are likely to be seen as 
both more persuasive and accountable if you are in a position 
to define and measure quality and QI. Second, these pragmatic 
advantages may coincide with more intrinsic advantages that 
arise from clarity, transparency and empirical testability. The 
actions of someone operating within technicist discourses of 
quality are therefore likely to be seen by many as more intel-
ligible and legitimate and may therefore be more effective in 
motivating and sustaining change.
On the other hand, there are aspects of healthcare improve-
ment where operationalisation of quality and QI is more prob-
lematic in principle and can potentially create problems in 
practice. For example, the notion that healthcare can be made 
more patient- centred by developing, applying and monitoring 
measures of patient experience is highly problematic. There 
are multiple competing candidates for what counts as good 
patient experience, and there is little evidence that applying 
such measures works to improve care on their own terms.20 
Moreover, in some cases reliance on measures that lack credi-
bility as indicators of patient- centredness may arguably under-
mine that aspect of quality as much as promote it. In very 
many cases the claim that some instance (some practice, some 
service) of healthcare has become better will be highly complex 
and inherently contestable. In these cases, pointing to a change 
in some set of measures may be relevant but is unlikely to be 
decisive. Rather we would be inclined to turn to a combination 
of quantitative and qualitative evidence and normative argu-
mentation to determine whether x or y is better and, more-
over, not to treat any single piece of evidence as conclusive in 
revealing whether healthcare has been improved.21 Of course 
some operationalisation will be possible in these cases but it 
is likely to distort or obscure important value questions. In 
other words, the surface ‘transparency’ of operationalisation 
can come at a cost, including a loss of transparency about why 
and how specific interpretations of quality have been selected 
from a repertoire of possible interpretations.
It is equally possible to shift emphasis in the other direc-
tion—that is, to apply the notion that quality judgements are 
contestable evaluative judgements to core areas of quality 
such as effectiveness. For example, if we were to adopt the 
plausible notion that what counts as ‘effective’ is sometimes a 
function of what matters to individual people, this would take 
us in that direction. It may, at least sometimes, be a way of 
introducing greater responsiveness and sensitivity into assess-
ments of effectiveness but it also undoubtedly creates chal-
lenges for measurement and comparability and thus overall 
for practicability.
Thus one of the core, but neglected, ethical questions the 
field of healthcare improvement faces is how we should strike 
a balance between the two approaches to thinking about 
quality- related assessments—‘measurable property’ or ‘eval-
uative judgement’ approaches—that we have highlighted. As 
well as providing an important agenda for healthcare ethics 
this also suggests the need to enlarge the field of ‘improvement 
science’ so that it more explicitly incorporates and addresses 
normative issues.22 Building greater capability in this interdis-
ciplinary area is an academically interesting project and is of 
great practical importance if claims about ‘improvements’ are 
to be rigorously grounded.
More broadly, and in conclusion, we are arguing that 
healthcare improvement—even understood in the relatively 
narrow sense as the quasi- professional domain of QI—is a very 
complex and diverse field, which merits an equally rich field of 
ethical analysis. As we have noted, there are multiple concep-
tions and dimensions of ‘quality’, and hence contests about 
how to interpret, prioritise and combine different dimen-
sions, such as effectiveness or person- centredness. In addition, 
there is a wide variety of (sometimes competing, sometimes 
complementary) QI methodologies which have partly arisen 
out of the adoption and adaptation of industrial models 
(eg, Total Quality Management, Lean, Six Sigma, etc23) and 
partly from a range of behavioural and social science develop-
ments.24 This means there are a multitude of questions about 
the ethical defensibility and merits of diverse improvement 
methods, and the specific challenges and dilemmas they pose 
for different kinds of actors—system leaders, managers, health 
professionals, patients and communities and so on—working 
at different levels of healthcare systems. Finally, the ethics of 
QI needs to be seen in the context of broader conceptions 
of, and debates about, healthcare improvement and needs to 
attend to the inherent ethical constitution of all improvement 
activities,25 and the ways in which improvement purposes and 
practices are necessarily saturated with ethical contestation.
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